British Armour in the Normandy Campaign
By John Buckley
Published April 6th 2006 by Routledge – 280 pages
Series: Military History and Policy
The popular perception of the performance of British armour in the Normandy campaign of 1944 is one of failure and frustration. Despite overwhelming superiority in numbers, Montgomery's repeated efforts to employ his armour in an offensive manner ended in a disappointing stalemate. Explanation of these and other humiliating failures has centred predominantly on the shortcomings of the tanks employed by British formations. This new study by John Buckley challenges the standard view of Normandy as a failure for British armour by analysing the reality and level of the supposed failure and the causes behind it.
1. Introduction 2. Fighting the Campaign 3. Operational Technique 4. Fighting the Battle 5. The Tank Gap 6. Design and Planning 7. Production and Supply 8. Morale and Motivation 9. Conclusion
John Buckley is Senior Lecturer in War Studies and History at the University of Wolverhampton. He is the author of The RAF and Trade Defence 1919-1945: Constant Endeavour (1995) and Air Power in the Age of Total War (1998).