Intelligence, Crises and Security
Prospects and Retrospects
Edited by Len Scott, R. Gerald Hughes
Published December 24th 2007 by Routledge – 256 pages
This collection of essays by leading experts seeks to explore what lessons for the exploitation and management of secret intelligence might be drawn from a variety of case studies ranging from the 1920s to the ‘War on Terror’.
Long regarded as the ‘missing dimension’ of international history and politics, public and academic interest in the role of secret intelligence has continued to grow in recent years, not least as a result of controversy surrounding the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11 2001.
Intelligence, Crises and Security addresses a range of themes including: crisis management, covert diplomacy, intelligence tradecraft, counterterrorism, intelligence ‘overload’, intelligence in relation to neutral states, deception, and signals intelligence. The work breaks new ground in relation to numerous key international episodes and events, not least as a result of fresh disclosures from government archives across the world.
This book was previously published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security and will be essential reading for students of intelligence, intelligence practitioners and general readers alike.
Learning from Intelligence History: Lessons for the 21st Century. Diplomatic Signalling and Intelligence during Crises: The Russo-Turkish War (1877-78), the Chanak Crisis (1922) and the Munich Crisis (1938). A Major Operation: The Clandestine Networks of the CIA in Western Europe. Britain and the Iraqi WMD Intelligence Failure. From Covert Diplomacy to Covert Action: Britain and the Yemen Civil War,1962-65. The Bush Administration and Iraq: The Mother of Intelligence Failures. The Western Secret Services, the East German Ministry of State Security and the Building of the Berlin Wall. Intelligence since Iraq: Overload in an Open-Source World. Lessons from the Shadows: The Once and Future History of Secret Intelligence? Response to Strategic Weakness: Egyptian Deception in the Yom Kippur War. Crisis Management in Colonial States: Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in Morocco and Syria after the First World War. Counter-Terrorism in Holland: Radical Fundamentalists and the Present Threat. Intelligence and Neutrality: The Case of Switzerland. Conclusion
Professor Len Scott and Dr R. Gerald Hughes teach intelligence studies and international history at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. Len Scott is Director of the Centre for Intelligence and International Security Studies (CIISS), and is Professor of International Politics. He specialises in Cold War and Nuclear History.
R. Gerald Hughes is lecturer in military history in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales Aberystwyth, an associate fellow of the Centre for Intelligence and International Security and the editor of the Study Group on Intelligence newsletter. He is the author of the book Britain, Germany and the Cold War: The Search for a European DÃ©tente 1949-1967 (Routledge, 2006). He has also published a number of articles in the International History Review, Cold War History, Diplomacy and Statecraft and elsewhere