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Daniel Dennett

Edited by John Symons

Routledge – 2014 – 1,648 pages

Series: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers

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    978-0-415-58814-0
    March 16th 2014

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SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY PRICE!

(Valid until 3 months after publication)

Daniel Dennett has been one of the central voices in the philosophy of mind for at least the past forty years. Unlike most philosophers of his generation, Dennett’s work has resonated far and wide. It has powerfully influenced the development of cognitive science, robotics, developmental psychology, and artificial intelligence. Indeed, his work has led to many new lines of inquiry. For example, he has developed a theory of consciousness which provides an approach to naturalizing mind which circumvents many of the most significant philosophical arguments against the possibility of a scientific explanation of consciousness.

The daunting quantity (and variable quality) of literature available on Dennett makes it difficult to discriminate the useful from the tendentious, superficial, and otiose. Moreover, because no comparable philosopher has had a profound impact across such a wide range of disciplines and on intellectual culture in general, responses to Dennett’s philosophy are dispersed across a broad range of scientific, philosophical, and cultural domains. That is why this new title in the highly regarded Routledge series, Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, is so urgently needed. Edited by John Symons, this new Routledge Major Work is a four-volume collection of the best scholarship on Dennett; the collected materials have been carefully selected from a wide range of academic journals, edited collections, research monographs, and other sources.

The tightly focused organization of this collection allows users quickly and easily to access both established and cutting-edge assessments of Dennett’s work. The set is also made for irresistible browsing. With comprehensive introductions to each volume, providing essential background information and relating the various works to each other, Daniel Dennett is destined to be an indispensable resource for research and study.

Contents

Volume I

Part 1: Critical Overviews and Introductions to Dennett’s Philosophy

1. B. Dahlborn, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 1–7.

2. M. Elton, ‘Dennett and the Philosophy of Mind’, Daniel Dennett: Reconciling Science and our Self-Conception (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), pp. 1–30.

3. P. Yu and G. Fuller, ‘A Critique of Dennett’, Synthese, 1986, 66, 4, 453–76.

4. D. L. Thompson, ‘Conclusion: Synthesis and Critical Assessment’, Daniel Dennett (London: Continuum, 2009), pp. 147–59.

Part 2: Intentionality

5. E. N. Zalta, review of Dennett’s The Intentional Stance, The Review of Metaphysics, 1989, 43, 2, 397–400.

6. D. Jacquetta, review of Dennett’s The Intentional Stance, Mind, 1988, XVCII, 619–24.

7. P. Kitcher, review of Dennett’s The Intentional Stance, The Philosophical Review, 1990, 99, 1, 126–8.

8. M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker, ‘Appendix 1: Daniel Dennett’, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003), pp. 413–35.

9. S. Webb, ‘Witnessed Behavior and Dennett’s Intentional Stance’, Philosophical Topics, 2010, 22, 1/2, 457–70.

10. K. Andrews, ‘Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2000, 7, 7, 12–24.

11. J. A. Fodor and E. Lepore, ‘D.C. Dennett: Meaning Holism and the Normativity of Intentional Ascription (And a Little More about Davidson)’, Holism: A Shopper’s Guide (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 137–61.

12. G. McCulloch, ‘Dennett’s Little Grains of Salt’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 1990, 1–12.

13. M. Slors, ‘Why Dennett Cannot Explain What it is to Adopt the Intentional Stance’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 1996, 46, 182, 93–8.

14. M. Ratcliffe, ‘A Kantian Stance on the Intentional Stance’, Biology and Philosophy, 2001, 16, 1, 29–52.

15. D. Beisecker, ‘Dennett’s Overlooked Originality’, Mind and Machines, 2006, 16, 1, 43–55.

16. R. G. Millikan, ‘On Mentalese Orthography’, in Bo Dahlborn (ed.), Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 97–123.

17. R. G. Millikan, ‘Reading Mother Nature’s Mind’, Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures (MIT Press, 2004), pp. 97–123.

18. N. Newton, ‘Dennett on Intrinsic Intentionality’, Analysis, 1992, 52, 1, 18–23.

19. P. Cam, ‘Dennett on Intelligent Storage’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1984, 45, 2, 395–430.

20. B. L. Keeley, ‘Fixing Content and Function in Neurobiological Systems: The Neuroethology of Electroreception’, Biology and Philosophy, 1999, 14, 3, 395–430.

Part 3: Mental Images and Time Perception

21. L. M. Russow, ‘Dennett, Mental Images, and Images in Context’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1985, 45, 4, 581–93.

22. J. Bricke, ‘Dennett’s Eliminative Arguments’, Philosophical Studies, 1984, 45, 3, 413–29.

23. P. S. Churchland and V. S. Ramachandran, ‘Filling In: Why Dennett is Wrong’, in Bo Dahlborn (ed.), Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 28–52.

24. S. J. Todd, ‘A Difference That Makes a Difference: Passing Through Dennett’s Stalinesque/Orwellian Impasse’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2009, 60, 3, 497–520.

25. J. Christie and J. Barresi, ‘Using Illusory Line Motion to Differentiate Misrepresentation (Stalinesque) and Misremembering (Orwellian) Accounts of Consciousness’, Consciousness and Cognition, 2002, 11, 2, 347–65.

26. R. Roache, ‘Mellor and Dennett on the Perception of Temporal Order’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 2003, 49, 195, 231–8.

27. G. Jarrett, ‘Conspiracy Theories of Consciousness’, Philosophical Studies, 1999, 96, 1, 45–58.

28. P. Bloomfield, ‘Dennett’s Misrememberings’, Philosophia, 1998, 26, 1, 207–18.

Volume II

Part 4: Overviews of the Multiple Drafts Theory of Consciousness

29. K. Akins, ‘Lost the Plot? Reconstructing Dennett’s Multiple Drafts Theory of Consciousness’, Mind & Language, 1996, 11, 1, 1–43.

30. A. Brook, ‘Judgments and Drafts Eight Years Later’, in Don Ross, Andrew Brook, and David Thompson (eds.), Dennett’s Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment (MIT Press, 2000), pp. 219–57.

Part 5: Critical Reactions to Dennett’s Theory of Consciousness

31. T. Nagel, review of Dennett’s ‘Content and Consciousness’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1972, 69, 8, 220–4.

32. R. Rorty, ‘Dennett on Awareness’, Philosophical Studies, 1972, 23, 3, 153–62.

33. R. Rorty, ‘Comments on Dennett’, Synthese, 1982, 53, 2, 181–7.

34. K. Gunderson, ‘Content and Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1972, 591–604.

35. R. Kirk, ‘The Best Set of Tools? Dennett's Metaphors and the Mind-Body Problem’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 1993, 43, 172, 335–43.

36. L. R. Baker, ‘Content Meets Consciousness’, Philosophical Topics, 2010, 22, 1/2, 1–22.

37. M. Tye, ‘Reflections on Dennett and Consciousness’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1993, 893–8.

38. S. Sedivy, ‘Must Conceptually Informed Perceptual Experience Involve Non-Conceptual Content?’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1996, 26, 3, 413–31.

39. S. Shoemaker, ‘Lovely and Suspect Ideas’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1993, 53, 4, 905–10.

40. N. Block, review of Dennett’s Consciousness Explained, Journal of Philosophy, 1993, 90, 181–93.

41. C. McGinn, ‘Consciousness Evaded: Comments on Dennett’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1995, 9, 241–9.

42. N. Block, ‘What is Dennett’s Theory a Theory of?’, Philosophical Topics, 1994, 22, 1/2, 23–40.

43. David M. Rosenthal, ‘First Person Operationalism and Mental Taxonomy’, Philosophical Topics, 1994, 22, 1/2, 319–49.

44. D. Hutto, ‘Consciousness Demystified: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Dennett’s Project’, The Monist, 1995, 78, 4, 464–79.

45. W. S. Robinson, ‘Orwell, Stalin, and Determinate Qualia’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1994, 75, 151–64.

46. P. M. Churchland, ‘Densmore and Dennett on Virtual Machines and Consciousness’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1999, 59, 3, 763–7.

47. A. A. Derksen, ‘Dennett’s Rhetorical Strategies in "Consciousness Explained"’, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2005, 36, 1, 29–48.

48. L. Marsh, review of Dennett’s Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness, Journal of Mind and Behavior, 2005, 26, 3, 207–14.

49. J. Toribio, ‘Why There Still Has to be a Theory of Consciousness’, Consciousness and Cognition 2, 1993, 28–47.

Part 6: Dennett on Qualia

50. E. Conee, ‘A Defense of Pain’, Philosophical Studies, 1984, 46, 2, 239–48.

51. D. D. Nikolinakos, ‘Dennett on Qualia: The Case of Pain, Smell and Taste’, Philosophical Psychology, 2000, 13, 4, 505–22.

52. J. Levine, ‘Out of the Closet’, Philosophical Topics, 2010, 22, 1/2, 107–26.

53. M. Garcia Carpintero, ‘Qualia that it is Right to Quine’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2003, 67, 2, 357–77.

54. B. Johnsen, ‘Dennett on Qualia and Consciousness: A Critique’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1997, 27, 1, 47–81.

55. E. Lormand, ‘Qualia! (Now Showing at a Theater Near You)’, Philosophical Topics, 2010, 22, 1/2, 127–56.

56. H. Robinson, ‘Dennett on the Knowledge Argument’, Analysis, 1993, 53, 3, 174–7.

57. S. Bringsjord, ‘The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind’, Philosophical and Phenomenological Research, 1999, 41–69.

58. T. L. S. Sprigge, ‘Is Dennett a Disillusioned Zimbo?’, Inquiry, 1993, 36, 1–2, 33–57.

59. T. Carman, ‘Dennett on Seeming’, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2007, 6, 1, 99–106.

Volume III

Part 7

60. R. Rorty, ‘Holism, Intrinsicality, and the Ambition of Transcendence’, Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 184–202.

61. W. Bechtel, ‘Realism, Instrumentalism, and the Intentional Stance’, Cognitive Science, 1985, 9, 4, 473–97.

62. L. R. Baker, ‘Instrumental Intentionality’, Philosophy of Science, 1989, 303–16.

63. C. Viger, ‘Where do Dennett’s Stances Stand? Explaining our Kind of Mind’, in Don Ross, Andrew Brook, and David Thompson (eds.), Dennett’s Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment (MIT Press, 2000), pp. 131–45.

64. W. S. Wilkerson, ‘Real Patterns and Real Problems: Making Dennett Respectable on Patterns and Beliefs’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1997, 35, 4, 557–70.

65. R. M. Heitner, ‘Is Design Relative or Real? Dennett on Intentional Relativism and Physical Realism’, Minds and Machines, 2000, 10, 2, 267–75.

66. J. Haugeland, ‘Pattern and Being’, Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 53–69.

67. B. Cohen, ‘Patterns Lost: Indeterminacy and Dennett’s Realism about Beliefs’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1995, 76, 1, 17–31.

68. C. Allen, ‘Mental Content’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1992, 43, 4, 537–53.

69. G. Rey, ‘Dennett’s Unrealistic Psychology’, Philosophical Topics, 1994, 22, 1/2, 259–89.

70. B. Ramberg, ‘Dennett’s Pragmatism’, Revue internationale de philosophie, 1999, 53, 207, 61–86.

71. D. Joslin, ‘Real Realization: Dennett’s Real Patterns Versus Putnam’s Ubiquitous Automata’, Minds and Machines, 2006, 16, 1, 29–41.

Part 8

72. C. Rovane, ‘The Personal Stance’, Philosophical Topics, 1994, 22, 1/2, 351–96.

73. J. McCarthy, ‘The Naturalist Narrative Self’, Dennett and Ricoeur on the Narrative Self (New York: Humanity Books, 2007), pp. 47–71.

74. T. De Villiers and P. Cilliers, ‘Narrating the Self: Freud, Dennett and Complexity Theory’, South African Journal of Philosophy, 2004, 23, 1, 34–53.

75. J. Ismael, ‘Saving the Baby: Dennett on Autobiography, Agency, and the Self’, Philosophical Psychology, 2006, 19, 3, 345–60.

76. L. Holt, ‘Metaphor, History, Consciousness: From Locke to Dennett’, The Philosophical Forum, 1999, 30, 3, 187–200.

77. D. Carr, ‘Phenomenology and Fiction in Dennett’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 1998, 6, 3, 331–44.

78. A. Clark, ‘That Special Something: Dennett on the Making of Minds and Selves’, in Andrew Brook and Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 187–205.

Part 9

79. J. C. Ahouse, ‘The Tragedy of a priori Selectionism: Dennett and Gould on Adaptationism’, Biology and Philosophy, 1998, 13, 3, 359–91.

80. T. M. Crowe, ‘Daniel Dennett’s Views on the Power and Pervasiveness of Natural Selection: An Evolutionary Biologist’s Perspective’, in Don Ross, Andrew Brook, and David Thompson (eds.), Dennett’s Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment (MIT Press, 2000), pp. 27–40.

81. S. J. Gould, ‘Darwinian Fundamentalism’, New York Review of Books, 1997, 44, 34–7.

82. D. L. Hull, review of Dennett’s ‘Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, Chicago Journals, 1996, 107, 1, 170–4.

83. J. Hodge, review of Dennett’s Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1997, 48, 3, 435–8.

84. D. Ivers, review of Dennett’s Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, Politics and the Life Sciences, 1996, 15, 1, 136–7.

85. H. A. Orr, ‘Dennett’s Dangerous Idea’, Evolution, 1996, 50, 1, 467–72.

86. P. Godfrey-Smith, ‘Maternal Effects: On Dennett and Darwin’s Dangerous Idea’, Philosophy of Science, 1998, 65, 4, 709–20.

87. J. Fodor, ‘Deconstructing Dennett’s Darwin’, Mind & Language, 1996, 11, 3, 246–62.

Volume IV

Part 10

88. G. Watson, review of Dennett’s Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, The Journal of Philosophy, 1986, 83, 9, 517–22.

89. T. B. Mooney, ‘Dennett on Ethics: Fitting the Facts against Greed for the Good’, in Don Ross, Andrew Brook, and David Thompson (eds.), Dennett’s Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment (MIT Press, 2000), pp. 309–26.

90. J. M. Fischer, review of Dennett’s Freedom Evolves, The Journal of Philosophy, 2003, 100, 12, 632–7.

91. A. C. Danto, review of Dennett’s Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, Mind, 1986, 95, 377, 127–9.

92. M. Slote, review of Dennett’s Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1987, 47, 4, 674–8.

93. G. Dworkin, review of Dennett’s Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, Ethics, 1986, 96, 2, 423–5.

94. M. Thornton, review of Dennett’s Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, Philosophy of Science, 1989, 56, 3, 543–4.

95. H. C. Steward, ‘Determinism and Inevitability’, Philosophical Studies, 2006, 130, 3, 535–63.

96. P. van Inwagen, ‘Dennett on "Could Have Done Otherwise"’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1984, 565–7.

97. M. Mameli, ‘On Dennett and the Natural Sciences of Free Will’, Biology and Philosophy, 2003, 18, 5, 731–42.

98. A. R. Mele, ‘Dennett on Freedom’, Metaphilosophy, 2005, 36, 4, 414–26.

99. M. Vargas, ‘Compatibilism Evolves? On Some Varieties of Dennett Worth Wanting’, Metaphilosophy, 2005, 36, 4, 460–75.

100. T. O’Connor, ‘Pastoral Counsel for the Anxious Naturalist: Daniel Dennett’s Freedom Evolves’, Metaphilosophy, 2005, 36, 4, 436–48.

Part 11

101. L. Wieseltier, ‘The God Genome’, New York Times, 2006, 19, 11–12.

102. D. L. Thompson, ‘Ethics and Religion: Evolution and Beyond’, Daniel Dennett (London and New York: Continuum, 2009), pp. 121–59.

103. J. Stone, review of Dennett’s Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, Zygon, 2009, 44, 3, 739–41.

104. L. Marsh, review of Dennett’s Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, The Journal of Mind and Behavior, 2006, 27, 3, 357–66.

Name: Daniel Dennett (Hardback)Routledge 
Description: Edited by John Symons. SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY PRICE! (Valid until 3 months after publication) Daniel Dennett has been one of the central voices in the philosophy of mind for at least the past forty years. Unlike most philosophers of his generation, Dennett’s work has...
Categories: Philosophy of Mind, General Reference, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology