Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China's Territorial Disputes
Routledge – 2004 – 240 pages
Series: Politics in Asia
This is a groundbreaking analysis of China's territorial disputes, exploring the successes and failures of negotiations that have taken place between its three neighbours, namely India, Japan and Russia. By using Roberts Putnam's two level game framework, Chung relates the outcome of these disputes to the actions of domestic nationalist groups who have exploited these territorial issues to further their own objectives. By using first-class empirical data and applying it to existing theoretical concepts, this book provides a detailed account of China's land and maritime border disputes that is both clear and accessible.
List of Maps, Figures and Graph Acknowledgements 1. Introduction 2. The Two-Level Game Hypothesis 3. The Diaoyu / Tiaoyutai / Senkaku Islands Dispute 4. The Zhenbao / Chenpao / Damansky Islands Dispute 5. The McMahon Line / Aksai Chin Dispute 6. Beyond Two-Level Games? The Role of Subnational, National and Transnational Actors in the South China Sea Islands Dispute 7. Testing the Propositions of the Two-Level Game Hypothesis 8. Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index
Chien-peng Chung is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.