Edited by Andrea Lavazza, Howard Robinson
Routledge – 2014 – 292 pages
Ontological materialism, in its various forms, has become the orthodox view in contemporary philosophy of mind. This book provides a variety of defenses of mind-body dualism, and shows (explicitly or implicitly) that a thoroughgoing ontological materialism cannot be sustained. The contributions are intended to show that, at the very least, ontological dualism (as contrasted with a dualism that is merely linguistic or epistemic) constitutes a philosophically respectable alternative to the monistic views that currently dominate thought about the mind-body (or, perhaps more appropriately, person-body) relation.
1. Introduction Andrea Lavazza and Howard Robinson Part 1: The Limits of Materialism 2. Against Physicalism Uwe Meixner 3. Problems of Physicalism Regarding the Mind Andrea Lavazza 4. Materialism, Dualism, and the Conscious Self David Lund Part 2: Dualism and Empirical Research 5. Neuroscience: Dualism in Disguise Riccardo Manzotti and Paolo Moderato 6. Quantum Theory of Mind Henry P. Stapp 7. A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts Martina Fürst Part 3: Cartesian (Substance) Dualism 8. What makes me me? A Defence of Substance Dualism Richard Swinburne 9. Naturalism and the Unavoidability of the Cartesian Perspective Howard M. Robinson 10. On What We Must Think Ralph C.S. Walker Part 4: Non-Cartesian Dualism 11. The Promise and Sensibility of Integrative Dualism Charles Taliaferro 12. The Dialectic of Soul and Body William Hasker 13. Dualism, Dual-Aspectism, and the Mind David Skrbina 14. Why My Body is Not Me: The Unity Argument for Emergentist Self–Body Dualism E.J. Lowe
Andrea Lavazza is a research fellow at the Centro Universitario Internazionale, Italy.
Howard Robinson is CEU Provost/Academic Pro-Rector of the Central European University, Hungary and Professor of Philosophy and Honorary Research Fellow at the University of Liverpool, UK.