Aberrant Beliefs and Reasoning
Edited by Niall Galbraith
Psychology Press – 2015 – 180 pages
An aberrant belief is extreme or unusual in nature. In the most serious cases these beliefs cause emotional distress in those who hold them, and typify the core symptoms of psychological disorders. Each of the chapters in this volume seeks to examine the role that biases in reasoning can play in the formation of aberrant beliefs.
The chapters consider several conjectures about the role of reasoning in aberrant belief, including the role of the jumping to conclusion bias in delusional beliefs, the probabilistic bias in paranormal beliefs, the role of danger confirming reasoning in phobias, and the controversial notion that people with schizophrenia do not succumb to specific forms of reasoning bias. There are also chapters evaluating different theoretical perspectives, and suggestions for future research.
Aberrant Beliefs and Reasoning is the first volume presenting an overview of contemporary research in this growing subject area. It will be essential reading for academics and students in the fields of human reasoning, cognitive psychology and philosophy, and will also be of great interest to clinicians and psychiatrists.
"Aberrant Beliefs and Reasoning will be required reading for everyone interested in understanding human rationality. The editor provides an excellent introductory overview of the field, and the further chapters advance research in this area whilst remaining accessible to the general reader. " – David Over, Department of Psychology, Durham University, UK
"Aberrant Beliefs and Reasoning will be an important resource for researchers of delusions – it offers new insights into dual-process theories of reasoning, meta-cognitive training, the role of affect, and the relationship between two-factor and prediction-error theories." – Robyn Langdon, ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders and Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, Australia
Introduction, Niall Galbraith 1. A psychological model of delusional belief: Integrating reasoning biases with perceptual, self-concept and emotional factors, Niall Galbraith and Ken Manktelow 2. Prediction-error and two-factor theories of delusion formation: Competitors or allies? Kengo Miyazono, Lisa Bortolotti and Matthew R. Broome 3. Reasoning and delusions: Do people with delusions really jump to conclusions? Rob Dudley and Kate Cavanagh 4. Affect, Dual Processes and some Pertinent Questions about Delusional Reasoning. Stephanie Rhodes and Claire Jones 5. Reasoning in schizophrenia. Amelia Gangemi and Valentina Cardella 6. Paranormal believers’ proneness to probabilistic reasoning biases: A review of the empirical literature. Paul Rogers 7. Danger-confirming reasoning and the persistence of phobic beliefs. Peter J. de Jong 8. Non-pharmacological Treatment Targeting Cognitive Biases underlying Delusions in Schizophrenia: Metacognitive Training and Therapy. Ryan Balzan, Todd S. Woodward, Mahesh Menon and Steffen Moritz
Niall Galbraith is Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Wolverhampton, UK. His research interests encompass delusional thinking, schizotypy, attitudes toward psychological disorders and help-seeking.